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ABSTRACT
Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system.
Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which
generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time
explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence
of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models
is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced
to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The
model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich












morelli.10@osu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most international organizations lack an external enforcement mechanism. In par-
ticular, if an organization relies on a voting system to make decisions, a government
cannot be forced to comply with the collective decision. It will do so only if the
short-term gain from defecting is outweighed by the future loss of cooperation. Mo-
tivated by this observation, in this paper we propose a theory of self-enforcing voting
systems.
In the real world of international organizations, there is a wide variation in
the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time. We distinguish
between two types of governance mode: unanimity systems and majority systems.
Some organizations, such as NATO and WTO, are governed by unanimity rule.1
Others, such as most United Nations agencies, are governed by some form of majority
rule. Still others have seen important changes of governance mode over time: for
example, the European Union has recently switched from unanimity to majority
in several policy areas, and the International Standards Organization has switched
from unanimity to a majority rule in the 1970s.2
There is a vast theoretical literature on voting systems, but most of the existing
models share the assumption that the outcome of the vote can be perfectly en-
forced. These enforceable-voting models have a diﬃcult time explaining the above-
mentioned variation in governance mode, and in particular the frequent occurrence
of the unanimity system. We will present a simple framework whose main departure
from standard voting models is the presence of a self-enforcement constraint. This
model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and
yields rich predictions on the determinants of the cross-organization and over-time
variation in the mode of governance.
Next we preview the structure of the model and the main results.
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon game where, at the outset, governments antic-
ipate that there will be a sequence of binary collective choices. In each instance,
one alternative will be the status quo and the other will be some change (collec-
1For the WTO, of course this statement applies only to rule-making activities, not to the dispute
settlement system, which is concerned with the enforcement of the agreed-upon rules. We note also
that MERCOSUR and NAFTA are governed by unanimity as well.
2We emphasize that a unanimity system is qualitatively diﬀerent from a majority system: the
former requires only coordination; the latter requires also enforcement, in order to keep in check the
minority members’ temptation to defect. For this reason, in the notion of “majority” we include
both the simple majority rule and supermajority rules.
2tive action). The collective action is eﬀective only if all members participate. Ex
ante, each member attaches some probability to the event that she will be in favor
or against changing the status quo for each future issue. Members’ preferences on
future issues can be correlated.
The voting rule is chosen ex ante, under a veil of ignorance about future issues.
Thus the optimal voting rule maximizes the ex-ante expected utility of the repre-
sentative member subject to a self-enforcement constraint: a government must have
incentive to comply with the collective decision, even if it happens to be in the mi-
nority. This requires that the future gains from cooperation outweigh the one-time
gain from defecting.
A key parameter in the model is the governments’ discount factor. We show
that, if the discount factor is higher than some critical level, the best self-enforcing
governance mode is the ﬁrst-best voting rule, which in this context is typically some
majority quota. But if the discount factor is lower than this critical level, the best
self-enforcing governance mode is the unanimity system. The discount factor can
be interpreted as capturing not only the players’ pure time preferences, but also the
probability that a player will still be in the game next period, and the frequency with
which the organization makes decisions. Thus, our model predicts that a majority
rule is more likely to be adopted in organizations where governments are more stable,
and in “busier” organizations.
Another important parameter in the model is the correlation among members’
preferences, that is the likelihood that members will agree on future issues. One
might expect that higher correlation favors unanimity over majority, but we ﬁnd
that the opposite is true: a higher degree of correlation expands the range of dis-
count factors for which the optimal self-enforcing institution is a majority system.
The model thus predicts that a majority rule is more likely to be adopted in more
homogeneous organizations.
In reality, a number of international organizations have diﬀerent voting rules for
diﬀerent types of issues. For example, the European Union applies the unanimity
rule for particularly sensitive issues, and a majority rule for more “technical” issues.
Our model suggests a theoretical explanation for this kind of dual decision making
systems. We consider an organization that expects to make decisions on two types of
issues, high-stake issues and low-stake issues, and ﬁnd that for intermediate values
of the discount factor the optimal voting rule is unanimity for high-stake issues and
majority for low-stake issues.
3Next we consider the role of international transfers. Transfers can make it easier
to satisfy the self-enforcement constraint in a majority system, because they can be
used to mitigate the minority members’ temptation to defect. We show that the
availability of transfers expands the range of discount factors for which a majority
system is sustainable. Thus the model suggests that we should be more likely
to observe a majority system in organizations that have the ﬂexibility to enact
pure transfers between its members. However, we also ﬁnd that transfers cannot
completely solve the enforceability problem: if the discount factor is low enough,
unanimity remains the best sustainable rule.
The next step of our analysis is to endogenize the organization size. When size is
endogenous, the model generates interesting predictions about the evolution of the
voting rule over time. We assume that in every period there is a random number
(possibly zero) of new candidates for membership, and current members choose
whether to admit the new candidates. We show that, for intermediate levels of
the discount factor, the optimal self-enforcing voting rule is unanimity up to some
(random) date and then switches to a majority rule. The reverse switch — from
majority to unanimity — can never happen. The model thus oﬀers a theoretical
explanation for the “stylized fact” that international organizations tend to move
from unanimity to majority, but not viceversa.
The model also generates predictions about the organization size and how it
correlates with the mode of governance. Under some conditions we can show that,
in steady state, the organization size is a (weakly) increasing function of the discount
factor. This is a consequence of the facts that (i) a higher discount factor facilitates
enforcement of the ﬁrst-best rule, and (ii) the optimal organization size conditional
on the ﬁrst-best rule is larger than the optimal organization size conditional on the
unanimity rule. Thus the model generates a prediction about the co-variation of
organization size and mode of governance: if organizations are heterogenous with
respect to the discount factor, organizations governed by unanimity should tend to
be smaller than organizations governed by majority.
Our paper contributes to two literatures. The ﬁrst one is the literature on self-
enforcing international agreements. To the best of our knowledge, all the models
in this class are repeated-game models where there is no scope for voting.3 Our
innovation with respect to this literature is that we consider a multilateral repeated
3For models of self-enforcing trade agreements, see for example the survey by Staiger [21]. For
models of international lending, see for example the survey by Eaton and Fernandez [11].
4game where it is eﬃcient to make decisions by voting. This is because players have
private information about their preferences, and a voting scheme can be used to
aggregate information and make eﬃcient collective choices.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on social choice and voting. All
t h ev o t i n gm o d e l st h a tw ea r ea w a r eo fi g n o r et h ee n f o r c e a b i l i t yp r o b l e m . F o r
this reason, these models are useful to examine issues of domestic institutions and
constitutional design, but their applicability to international organizations is limited.
In this literature, a paper that is related to ours is Barbera and Jackson [4]. They
have a binary collective choice model where members’ preferences on future issues
are uncertain,4 and each player is characterized by a distinct probability of being in
favor of the status quo. They study self-stable voting rules, i.e. voting rules such
that there is no alternative rule that would beat the given voting rule if the given
voting rule is used to choose between the rules. Our main departures from Barbera
and Jackson’s model are that (i) we examine self-enforcing voting rules, whereas
they assume perfect enforcement, and (ii) we assume that the voting rule is chosen
under a veil of ignorance, so that in our case the natural criterion to select a voting
rule is the maximization of the members’ common ex-ante utility. Another paper
that is related to ours is Ledyard and Palfrey [14]. They study a situation in which
a group of individuals must decide whether to produce a discrete public good and
how to pay for it, and each individual’s preferences may be of two types. Among
other things, they show that an eﬃcient public good decision can be achieved by a
majority voting rule.5 They do not consider the implications of repeated interaction
for the optimal mechanism.
Our theory provides a new rationale for the unanimity rule, which is the lack
of enforceability. This is certainly not the ﬁrst attempt to rationalize the use of
unanimity rule. The classic contributions by Wicksell [23] and Buchanan and Tul-
lock [6] proposed a simple argument in favor of unanimity. Their argument was
b a s e do na ne x - p o s tP a r e t o - e ﬃciency criterion: unanimity is the only rule under
which collective action is taken only if it is a Pareto-improvement over the status
quo. In contrast, we adopt an ex-ante eﬃciency criterion within a veil-of-ignorance
setting. In this setting, if external enforcement is available, the ex-ante eﬃcient rule
4For early discussions and motivations of models with a binary choice between alternatives with
uncertain values in voters’ minds, see Niemi and Weisberg [18], Badger [3], and Curtis [9].
5Ledyard and Palfrey [15] show that, under plausible conditions, simple binary voting is asymp-
totically eﬃcient, as the number of voters becomes large, even when voters’ preferences can take a
continuum of values.
5is (almost always) a majority rule, and unanimity may become optimal if there is
no external enforcement.6
Two other papers that are related to ours are Roberts [20] and Barbera, Maschler
and Shalev [5]. Both of these papers study the dynamics of an organization in
which current members have heterogeneous preferences about the admission of new
members, and vote on admissions in every period. These models diﬀer from ours
at least in three respects. First, the voting rule in these models is exogenous, and
assumed to be a simple majority rule. Second, voting is only on admissions of new
members, not on policy issues. Third, there are no issues of enforceability.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a static model of
collective action. First we solve for the ﬁrst-best outcome, then we characterize
the equilibria of the one-shot game, with and without enforcement. In section 3
we characterize the optimal self-enforcing voting rule in the repeated version of the
game, when the size of the organization is exogenous and constant. In section 4 we
study how the optimal voting rule and the size of the organization evolve together.
In section 5 we extend the analysis to situations where the collective action may be
eﬀective even if not all members participate (the case of “impure” collective action).
In section 6 we oﬀer some concluding remarks.
2 The Static Model
Consider an organization with N members. Each member chooses a binary action,
ai ∈ {0,1} (i =1 ,...,N). Taking the action (ai =1 ) is interpreted as participating
in a collective action, such as going to war, or adopting a common currency, or
changing a common agricultural policy, or harmonizing a standard. Not taking the
action (ai =0 ) is interpreted as preserving the status quo. In this section and the
next we assume that N is ﬁxed, that is, we do not consider the possibility of entry
or exit. In section 4 we will extend the model to allow for endogenous N.
We assume that the collective action is eﬀective only if all members participate,
otherwise the status quo is kept. In particular, each of the N players receives a
6Also Aghion and Bolton [1] and Guttman [13] argue that, in a veil-of-ignorance setting with
perfect enforcement, majority generally dominates unanimity from the standpoint of ex-ante eﬃ-
ciency. These papers do not consider issues of enforceability. Other papers that provide theoretical
justiﬁcations for (simple or super) majority rules are May [16], Rae [19], Taylor [22], Caplin and
Nalebuﬀ [7], Austen-Smith and Banks [2], Dasgupta and Maskin [10], and Messner and Polborn
[17]. All of these models assume enforceability of majority decisions.
6positive beneﬁt B if ai =1for all i, and zero beneﬁt otherwise. We will often refer
to this case as “pure” collective action. In a later section we will discuss the case
in which the collective action may be eﬀective even if some of the members do not
participate (the case of “impure” collective action). For the moment we note that
there are situations in reality for which the assumption of pure collective action is
not unrealistic. Consider for example an economic union, where goods and factors
are free to move within the union and member countries have a harmonized set
of policies in areas such as trade, immigration and taxation. Any change in the
common policies must be decided collectively, and if any member does not go along
with the change, its beneﬁts are compromised for the whole union. If for example
the union decides to increase the common external tariﬀ and one member does not
go along, the eﬀects of the tariﬀ hike may be undone.
For each member, participating in the collective action is costly. For some mem-
bers the cost is lower than the beneﬁt, but for others the cost exceeds the beneﬁt.
This is a simple way of capturing situations where the members’ interests over the
collective action may diverge. Formally, we assume that player i’s cost of action
θi takes value θL or θH,w i t hθL <B<θ H.T h u s ,a l o w - θ member is in favor of
the collective action, a high-θ member is against it. The parameter θi is player i’s
private information. This can be interpreted as the economic or the political cost of
changing the status quo for country i.
To summarize, player i has the following utility function:
U(ai,n,θi)=B · I[n=N] − aiθi (1)
where n ∈ {ai,...,N−1+ai} denotes the total number of members taking action.7
What we have described so far is the ex post stage of the model. We now
step back to an ex-ante perspective. Ex ante, players are under a veil of ignorance
7We have assumed that, if member i takes action (a
i =1 ), he incurs cost θ
i regardless of the
other members’ actions. This assumption can be weakened substantially: we only need to assume
that a small fraction  >0 of the cost is incurred regardless. More formally, we can generalize the




i. The interpretation is that, if the collective
action is not undertaken (n<N ), member i can recover a fraction (1 − ε) of the cost, while a
fraction ε of the cost cannot be recovered. For any ε ∈ (0,1], our results hold exactly as stated. An
alternative setting that would yield the same results is the following two-stage game. In the ﬁrst
stage, players decide whether to participate in the collective action. In the second stage, each player
can conﬁrm or reverse the decision when new information about the cost becomes available, but
in the latter case he incurs a small cost. This could be thought of as a “ratiﬁcation” game, where
not ratifying the initial decision implies a small political cost. Also in this game, the status-quo
outcome (a
i =0for all i) would be an undominated equilibrium.
7about future issues. The idea is that the nature of future issues is uncertain, and
therefore each player does not know which side of the issue she will be on. We
capture this idea by assuming that at the ex-ante stage θ =( θ1,...,θN) is a random
vector distributed according to the common-knowledge probability distribution P(θ)
over support Θ = {θL,θH}N. This distribution is symmetric with respect to its N
arguments, which implies that the N players are ex-ante symmetric with respect to
t h ef u t u r ei s s u e .W ec a nt h i n ko fθ as summarizing the relevant state of the world.
In the concluding section we will discuss more thoroughly the veil of ignorance
assumption and how results are likely to change if players are ex-ante asymmetric.
2.1 First-best Outcome
The symmetric ﬁrst-best outcome is the mapping from states to actions that maxi-
mizes the members’ common expected utility, or in other words, the ex-ante Pareto-
eﬃcient outcome that gives the same expected utility to all members. Our focus on
“egalitarian” outcomes can be justiﬁed at this stage by the assumption that players
are ex-ante symmetric, but will receive further justiﬁcation in the section on self-
enforcing rules, where we will show that egalitarian rules are easier to enforce than
non-egalitarian ones. For simplicity, in what follows we will simply speak of “ﬁrst
best,” omitting the qualiﬁer “symmetric.”
It is easy to characterize the ﬁrst-best outcome in this model. Given our assump-
tions on payoﬀs, we can focus on two vectors of actions, the one where everyone takes
the action and the one where nobody does. We can then formulate the problem as
choosing a mapping from the state of the world θ to a collective action a ∈ {0,1}.
Given that players are ex-ante identical, we can maximize the members’ aggregate





P(θ)a(θ)[N1(θ)(B − θL)+( N − N1(θ))(B − θH)]
where N1(θ) is the number of members that support the collective action.
Clearly, it is optimal to take the collective action in all the states where its
aggregate beneﬁt, B·N, exceeds its aggregate cost, N1(θ)θL+(N −N1(θ))θH.T h i s
implies that it is eﬃcient to take the collective action if and only if N1 exceeds the
quota q∗ ≡ d θH−B
θH−θLNe,w h e r edxe denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal
to x.
8Proposition 1 The ﬁrst-best outcome is: ai =1for all i if N1 ≥ q∗, ai =0for all
i if N1 <q ∗,w h e r eq∗ = d θH−B
θH−θLNe.
Note that ex-ante eﬃciency generally requires some players to act against their
own interest ex-post. A simple two-player example can illustrate this point. Suppose
B =1 , θL = .5 and θH =1 .2. Then, from an ex-ante point of view, it is desirable
for both players to take the action whenever one of them would like to. To see
this, recall that maximizing the players’ common ex-ante utility is equivalent to
maximizing the sum of their utilities in each state. Consider a state in which the
players disagree, that is one player has cost .5 and the other has cost 1.2.I ft h e yb o t h
take the action, the joint payoﬀ is (1 − .5) + (1 − 1.2) = .3, whereas the alternative
is zero, therefore both should take the action.
2.2 One-Shot Game without Enforcement
Let us consider the basic game in which the organization members choose their
actions ai only once, and no external enforcement is available.
Since players have private information, it is compelling to allow for communica-
tion before actions are chosen. A natural way to introduce communication in this
context is to consider the following timing: after observing her type θi,e a c hp l a y e r
simultaneously sends a public message vi ∈ {θL,θH}; then players simultaneously
choose actions. We interpret vi = θL as a vote in support of collective action (a
“yes” vote), and vi = θH as a “no” vote.
A natural equilibrium notion for this kind of game is that of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. The game admits multiple equilibria. We are interested in charac-
terizing the “best” equilibrium, i.e. the one that maximizes the players’ common
ex-ante utility, and the “worst” equilibrium, i.e., the one that gives players the low-
est ex-ante utility. The best equilibrium is interesting because it represents an upper
bound to what players can accomplish without the help of external enforcement or
reputation mechanisms. The worst equilibrium will be important as a punishment
when we analyze the repeated game.
The worst equilibrium is one in which messages are ignored and the status quo is
never changed: ai =0for all i regardless of the state. This is clearly an equilibrium:
knowing that no one takes action, it is individually optimal not to take action. It
is also clear that there can be no worse equilibrium than this, because it holds each
player at its maximin payoﬀ, which is zero. We will refer to this as the “status-quo
equilibrium”.
9The best equilibrium is one in which each player votes sincerely (vi = θi)a n d
then takes action (ai =1 ) if and only if all players have voted in favor of action.
This can be viewed as a “unanimity equilibrium”: players vote (sincerely), and
then the collective action is taken if and only if all players vote in favor. To see
that this is indeed an equilibrium, note that (i) no player has incentive to take
ad i ﬀerent action, given the other players’ actions and given that all players have
reported truthfully, and (ii) no player has incentive to lie about his preferences,
given the subgame strategies. To see that there can be no better equilibrium, note
t h ef o l l o w i n g :t oa c h i e v eam o r ee ﬃcient outcome, it would be necessary for some
player to play ai =1when θi = θH, but this can never be individually rational,
hence there would be an incentive to deviate. The following proposition summarizes
the worst and best equilibrium outcomes:
Proposition 2 The worst equilibrium of the one shot game is: ai =0in all states
(status quo equilibrium). The best equilibrium of the one shot game is: each mem-
ber i votes sincerely, and takes action if and only if all members have voted “yes”
(unanimity equilibrium).
The unanimity equilibrium is more eﬃcient than the status-quo equilibrium, be-
cause it yields the status quo for N1 <Nand a more eﬃcient outcome for N1 = N,
but in general it does not deliver the ﬁrst-best outcome. It is important to empha-
size that no external enforcement is needed to sustain the unanimity equilibrium.
However, playing this equilibrium requires a certain amount of coordination, thus
we think of this equilibrium as capturing a simple form of organization.
2.3 One-Shot Game with Enforceable Voting
We now consider the benchmark scenario in which external enforcement is avail-
able, in the sense that any contract based on veriﬁable information can be directly
enforced.
Since the θi values are private information, hence not veriﬁable, the parties
cannot write a contract that is contingent on the realizations of θ. However, it is
not hard to show that the ﬁrst-best outcome can be implemented with the following
voting rule: after uncertainty is realized, each player casts a vote vi ∈ {θL,θH},
and then all members participate in the collective action if and only if at least
q∗ = d θH−B
θH−θLNe members have voted in favor. The key is to note that, given the
10proposed voting rule, each player has incentive to vote sincerely.8 Sincere voting
then immediately implies the claim. Note the role of external enforcement: if the
majority of the group votes in favor of the collective action, all the members that
disagree are forced to participate. Without external enforcement, the minority could
not be forced to go along with the majority. The following proposition summarizes:
Proposition 3 If external enforcement is available, the ﬁrst-best outcome can be
implemented by a voting rule with quota q∗ = d θH−B
θH−θLNe.
We emphasize that the optimal enforceable voting rule is independent of the
distribution over possible states, and in particular of the degree of correlation in the
members’ preferences. We also note that, if one disregards the integer constraint,
the relative quota q∗/N is independent of the organization size N.A sw ew i l la r g u e
later, the degree of correlation and the size of the organization will play a more
critical role in the absence of external enforcement.
It is possible that the optimal enforceable voting rule is unanimity, that is q∗ =
N. This however is a rather special case, which obtains when B is close to θL.T h u s ,
if external enforcement is available, unanimity is typically dominated by some other
rule. We will argue in the next section that the parameter region where unanimity
is optimal expands dramatically when collective decisions must be self-enforcing. To
focus on the interesting case, we will assume henceforth that q∗ = d θH−B
θH−θLNe <N .
Under some conditions, the optimal voting rule may be submajoritarian, that is
q∗ ≤ N/2. However, as the previous literature has pointed out, submajority rules
can create instability in the decision-making process.9 Since we think of a voting
rule as a long-term decision-making procedure that must deal with many diﬀerent
issues, the nature of which is uncertain ex ante, it is reasonable to suppose that the
designers of the institution would want to avoid any potential instability problem,
and would therefore rule out submajority rules. This could be captured in the model
by imposing a feasibility constraint q>N / 2 on the choice of voting rule. Our results
8It is easy to see that voting sincerely is a weakly dominant strategy for each player. Non-sincere
voting equilibria exist, but these are characterized by weakly dominated strategies. For example,
given q
∗ > 1 it is an equilibrium for everyone to vote “no” independently of θ
i, because in this case
the probability of being pivotal for each player is zero.
9Suppose for example that half of the members support the status quo (a =0 )a n dh a l fo ft h e
members support change (a =1 ). A vote under a submajority rule will result in a =1being the
new status quo. But then the other half of the members would support a change back to a =0 .
This can potentially give rise to cycles back and forth between a =0and a =1 . See Barbera and
Jackson [4] for a more thorough discussion of the problems associated with submajority rules.
11would then change in the direction of predicting a simple majority rule when the
unconstrained optimum is a submajority rule. To keep the exposition lean, however,
we will simply assume q∗ = d θH−B
θH−θLNe >N / 2, rather than imposing this constraint.
In sum, we will assume throughout the paper that N/2 <q ∗ <N ,o r ,i nw o r d s ,
that the ﬁrst-best voting rule is a majority rule.
3 Self-Enforcing Voting
We now consider the case that is most relevant for an international organization,
namely the case in which no external enforcement is available. In other words, the
organization members cannot commit to give up sovereignty. Under these circum-
stances, the only way to enforce cooperation is through repeated interaction. We
follow the tradition of the literature on self-enforcing agreements by casting the
problem in a repeated-game framework.
We now suppose that the game described in section 2.2 is repeated inﬁnitely
many times, and introduce time subscripts in the notation. In each period, each
member privately observes the realization of θi
t ∈ {θL,θH}, then sends a public
message vi
t ∈ {θL,θH}, and then chooses an action ai
t ∈ {0,1}. The distribution
of the vector θt (state of the world) is symmetric with respect to its N arguments
and is iid across periods. The assumption of symmetric and iid distribution is a
simple way of extending the notion of a veil of ignorance to a repeated game setting:
players do not know which side of a future issue they will be on, and today’s issue
is no indication of what future issues will be like.
All governments have discount factor δ. This parameter can be interpreted as
capturing the governments’ degree of stability as well as the frequency with which
decisions are made within the organization. Other things equal, δ will be higher if
governments are more stable and if issues come up more frequently.
A natural equilibrium notion for this type of game is that of Public Perfect
Equilibrium.10 The ﬁrst observation is that we can focus on punishment strategies
that prescribe a permanent reversion to the status-quo equilibrium following any
deviation (trigger punishment). This is because (a) the status quo equilibrium
keeps the deviator at his maxmin payoﬀ, and (b) since there will be no punishment
episodes on the equilibrium path, it is best to punish deviations most severely. A
theoretical limitation of trigger punishments is that they are not renegotiation-proof;
10See Fudenberg and Tirole [12] for a deﬁnition and a discussion of this equilibrium notion.
12we refer the reader to the concluding section for a discussion of this issue.
Having pinned down the behavior of players oﬀ the equilibrium path, we can now
turn to the equilibrium path. We restrict our attention to symmetric and stationary
equilibrium paths, where stationary means that votes and actions at time t can
depend only on the current state of the world θt. At the end of this section we will
discuss the motivations for these restrictions.
Given our restriction to symmetric and stationary equilibrium paths, it can be
shown that there is no loss of generality in focusing on strategies where players
behave according to a simple voting rule, and vote sincerely. More precisely, we can
focus on strategies with the following structure: (i) ai
t =1∀i if V 1
t ≥ q and ai
t =0
∀i if V 1
t <q ,w h e r eV 1
t =# {j : v
j
t = θL} and q is some integer in {1,2,...,N};( i i )
vi
t = θi
t. This class of strategies is indexed by the voting rule q. We say that a voting
rule q is self-enforcing if it is part of an equilibrium strategy. Among the set of self-
enforcing voting rules, we look for the one that maximizes the players’ common
expected payoﬀ (or the optimal one). The optimal self-enforcing voting rule is of
particular interest because it represents the upper bound to the eﬃciency that can
be achieved without the help of external enforcement. The following proposition
characterizes such voting rule.
Proposition 4 There exists a critical level δ ∈ (0,1) such that the optimal self-
enforcing voting rule is q = q∗ for δ ≥ δ and q = N for δ<δ .
Proof. The key step is to write the no-defect conditions for a given voting rule
q. The only incentive to cheat that we need to consider is for a member i that is
supposed to take action when he prefers the status quo, i.e., when θi
t = θH and
V 1
t ≥ q. The gain from cheating is θH −B, and the discounted loss from cheating is
δ




the one-period common expected utility given voting rule q. Clearly, the unanimity
rule q = N need not satisfy any constraint, thus the problem boils down to
maxq U(q)
s.t.θ H − B ≤ δ
1−δU(q) if q<N
(2)
Note that, since the RHS of (2) is maximized for q = q∗, we can restrict attention to
t w ov o t i n gr u l e s ,q = q∗ and q = N.I fq = q∗ satisﬁes (2), it is also the optimal self-
enforcing voting rule. If q = q∗ does not satisfy (2) then the optimal self-enforcing
voting rule is unanimity (q = N). Clearly, there is a critical level δ ∈ (0,1) such
that q = q∗ satisﬁes (2) if and only if δ ≥ δ. The claim follows. QED.
13This result suggests that a majority rule is more likely to be adopted in orga-
nizations where governments are more patient or stable, and in organizations that
make decisions with higher frequency.
Notice the bang-bang nature of the result: it is never optimal to choose a majority
quota that is intermediate between the ﬁrst best q∗ and unanimity. This is because
increasing q does not reduce the gain from defecting, unless it is increased all the
way to q = N, in which case defections are no longer an issue.
Next we want to discuss our restrictions on the set of equilibria. We start
from the restriction to stationary voting rules. In principle one could also consider
non-stationary rules where today’s rule depends on the way players have voted in
the past, but extending the analysis in this way is a very diﬃcult task.11 From a
theoretical standpoint this is a limitation, however we are somewhat comforted by
the fact that we do not observe complicated history-dependent voting rules in real
international organizations.
We have also restricted our attention to decision-making rules that give the same
expected utility to all players, or “egalitarian” rules. We have ignored for example
“dictatorial” rules that give all the decision-making power to a single player. This
restriction seems natural given the assumption that players are ex-ante symmetric.
In addition to this, egalitarian rules are easier to sustain than non-egalitarian rules,
in the sense that they are self-enforcing for a wider range of discount factors. The
reason is simple. Suppose δ = δ, so that the egalitarian ﬁrst-best rule q∗ is barely
sustainable, and consider moving to a non-egalitarian rule. Since the q∗ rule is ex-
ante Pareto eﬃcient, this move must decrease the expected payoﬀ for some member,
thus tightening this member’s incentive constraint. Since under the q∗ rule the
incentive constraint of each member was binding, under the non-egalitarian rule
some incentive constraint will be violated, therefore this rule is not self-enforcing.
The following remark records this result:
Remark 1 The egalitarian ﬁrst-best rule q∗ is self-enforcing for a strictly wider
range of δ than any non-egalitarian rule.
11For example, one could think of a weighted voting scheme with history-dependent weights of
the following type: the players who vote “no” at time t receive a higher voting weight at time
t +1 , provided they do not cheat at the action stage. Another example is a system of storable
votes as proposed by Casella [8]. These schemes might conceivably diminish the high-cost players’
temptation to cheat. But note that they would introduce incentives to vote strategically (a low-
cost player would be tempted not to support the collective action), and for this reason the analysis
becomes very complicated.
14As an example, compare the q∗ rule with a dictatorial rule that gives all the
decision-making power to player 1. Suppose that the cost levels θi are independent
across players, and let pL =P r ( θi = θL). Then it is easy to verify that the dictatorial
rule gives each player i =2 ,...,N an expected utility of Ui =( pL)2(B − θL)+
pL(1 − pL)(B − θH).I fpL is suﬃciently high or (θH − B)/(B − θL) is suﬃciently
low, the dictatorial rule gives each member a positive expected utility, so that all
ex-ante participation constraints are satisﬁed. However, players i =2 ,...,N get
a lower expected utility than under the egalitarian ﬁrst-best rule q∗, therefore ex
post they will have a stronger incentive to defect. Note that the problem is truly
one of enforcement: in the parameter region under consideration, non-egalitarian
rules satisfy all the ex-ante participation constraints, but violate the ex-post self-
enforcement constraints.
3.1 Correlation
A natural question is how the optimal self-enforcing voting rule is aﬀected by the
correlation among members’ preferences. As we saw in section 2.1, the optimal
enforceable voting rule does not depend on the correlation among the preference
shocks θi. However, the range of discount factors for which the ﬁrst-best rule q∗
is self-enforcing does depend on such correlation. Indeed, we can show that, under
mild assumptions on the probability distribution, the range of discount factors for
which q∗ is self-enforcing expands when the correlation among members’ preferences
is increased.
We continue to assume that the joint distribution P(θ1,...,θN) is symmetric with
respect to its N arguments, and parametrize correlation in the following way. Let
N1
−i be the number of members in favor of action excluding member i. T h i si sa
random variable with support {0,1,...,N− 1}.L e t Pρ(N1
−i|θi) be the probability
distribution of N1
−i conditional on θi.T h e s u p e r s c r i p t ρ denotes a correlation pa-
rameter. A natural assumption is that ρ aﬀects this conditional distribution in a
















It is also natural to assume that ρ does not aﬀect the marginal probability pL =
Pr(θi = θL). We take the extreme values of ρ to be ρ =0(independence) and
ρ =1(perfect correlation). However, to simplify the statement of the next result,
15we will ignore the extreme case ρ =1(for which any voting rule is equivalent to the
unanimity rule and is trivially self-enforcing), and will focus on the range ρ ∈ [0,1).
Proposition 5 Higher correlation of preferences facilitates enforcement of the ﬁrst-




,w i t h0 <δ 0 <δ 00 < 1,
such that:
(i) If δ ≤ δ0, the optimal self-enforcing rule is q = N for all ρ;
(ii) If δ0 <δ<δ 00, the optimal self-enforcing rule is q = N for low values of ρ and
q = q∗ for high values of ρ;
(iii) If δ ≥ δ00, the optimal self-enforcing rule is q = q∗ for all ρ.
Proof. The one-period expected utility given q∗ can be written as
Uρ(q∗)=pLPρ(N1
−i ≥ q∗−1|θi = θL)(B−θL)−(1−pL)Pρ(N1
−i ≥ q∗|θi = θH)(θH−B)
Assumption (3) implies that, as ρ increases, Uρ(q∗) increases. Deﬁne δ(ρ) to be the
(unique) value of δ that solves θH − B = δ
1−δUρ(q∗).C l e a r l y ,δ(ρ) is decreasing in
ρ.L e tδ0 ≡ δ(1) and δ00 ≡ δ(0).F o rδ ≤ δ0,t h eq∗ rule is not incentive compatible
for any ρ ∈ [0,1);f o rδ0 <δ<δ 00,t h eq∗ rule is incentive compatible if and only if
ρ ≥ δ−1(δ),w h e r eδ−1(·) is the inverse function of δ(·);a n df o rδ ≥ δ00,t h eq∗ rule
is incentive compatible for all ρ. The claim follows. QED.
Intuition might have suggested that a higher degree of correlation makes unanim-
ity more attractive relative to a majority rule. The analysis however points in the
opposite direction, and the reason is the following. As ρ increases, the value of the
q∗ rule relative to unanimity (as captured for example by the ratio Uρ(q∗)/Uρ(N))
may well decrease, but what matters for the optimal self-enforcing rule is only the
absolute value of the q∗ rule. When the members of an organization are more likely
to have the same preferences regarding future collective actions, the value of the
relationship is higher, therefore the cost of defecting is higher, and hence the orga-
nization is more likely to adopt the ﬁrst-best rule.12
Thus the model broadly predicts that organizations whose members have more
homogenous preferences are more likely to be governed by majority rather than by
unanimity. We emphasize that this result is due speciﬁcally to the presence of a self-
enforcement constraint, since the optimal enforceable voting rule q∗ is independent
of the degree of correlation.
12In the extreme case of perfect correlation, of course, the q
∗ rule and the unanimity rule are
equivalent, so the problem is not interesting.
163.2 Sensitive vs. Technical Issues
Thus far we have assumed that all the issues faced by the organization are character-
ized by similar stakes. Formally, we have assumed that the possible cost realizations
(θL,θH)a n dt h eb e n e ﬁt B are the same for all issues. Suppose now that there
are two types of issue: (i) high-stake (or sensitive) issues, and (ii) low-stake (or
technical) issues. Let (θ1
L,θ1
H)a n d( θ2
L,θ2
H)d e n o t et h ep o s s i b l ec o s tr e a l i z a t i o n s
respectively for sensitive and technical issues, and assume for simplicity that the
beneﬁt B is the same for all issues. A sensitive issue is one that players feel more





Intuitively, under a majority system, the incentive to defect by high-cost mem-
bers is stronger for sensitive issues than for technical ones. This suggests that under
some conditions the optimal self-enforcing governance system should be one in which
sensitive issues are decided by unanimity and technical issues by majority. In what
follows we examine this intuition more rigorously.
We assume that sensitive and technical issues come up randomly over time.
Formally, we assume that in each period the cost vector θt is drawn from one of
two distributions: with probability p1 it is drawn from a distribution P1(θ), which
has support {θ1
L,θ1
H}N and is symmetric with respect to its N arguments; and with
probability 1−p1 it is drawn from a distribution P2(θ), which has support {θ2
L,θ2
H}N
and is also symmetric with respect to its N arguments. We continue to assume that
θt is iid across periods.
The individual cost realizations are private information, but the nature of the
issue (sensitive or technical) is common knowledge, thus the voting rule can be
conditioned on the nature of the issue. To focus on the interesting case, we assume
that the ﬁrst-best voting rule is a majority rule for both types of issue: N/2 <q ∗
j <










Ne. All other assumptions of the model are
unchanged.
We consider decision-making systems where sensitive issues are decided by a
voting rule q1 and technical issues are decided by a (possibly diﬀerent) voting rule
q2.W el o o kf o rt h ep a i r( q1,q 2) that maximizes the common expected utility subject
to the relevant incentive constraints. We can write the common one-period expected
13The second inequality will actually not matter for the result, so we could alternatively deﬁne a
sensitive issue simply as one for which θH is higher.
17utility given (q1,q 2)a s
U(q1,q 2) ≡ p1U1(q1)+( 1− p1)U2(q2)
where Uj(qj) is the common one-period expected utility if the issue is of type j.
The gain from defecting for a high-cost type, given an issue of type j,i sθ
j
H − B,




H − B ≤ δ
1−δU(q1,q 2) if qj <N , j=1 ,2
(4)
Note that the RHS of the incentive constraint is identical across issues, whereas the
LHS is higher for sensitive issues. This implies, using the logic of Proposition 4,
that there exists an intermediate interval of δ such that the optimal pair of rules is
(N,q∗
2). The following proposition records this result:
Proposition 6 If issues can be of two types, high-stake and low-stake, there is an
intermediate interval of δ for which the optimal self-enforcing rule is a majority rule
for low-stake issues and unanimity for high-stake issues.
We emphasize that this result is driven by the presence of a self-enforcement
constraint. Under perfect enforceability, both types of issue would be governed by
the ﬁrst-best majority rule q∗
j. In fact, it is possible that under perfect enforceability
the optimal majority quota is higher for technical issues than for sensitive issues
(q∗
1 <q ∗
2), and introducing the self-enforcement constraint reverses this ranking.
This result suggests that enforcement considerations may contribute to explain
why, in some international organizations, some issues are decided by unanimity and
some others by majority rule. In the EU, for example, most issues are decided by
(simple or qualiﬁed) majority rule, but a number of sensitive issues are decided by
unanimity rule, for example issues of foreign policy, security policy, agreements with
external countries and accession of new members.
In the remainder of the paper we will go back to the assumption that there is
only one type of issue.
3.3 International Transfers
T h u sf a rw eh a v ei m p l i c i t l ya s s u m e dt h a tt r ansfers are not available. This assump-
tion is realistic in some settings but not in others. For example, in the European
Union there has been an increasing use of monetary transfers over time, while in
18the WTO transfers have hardly ever been used. Suppose now that such transfers
are possible, and that they enter utility additively. Transfers may help sustain the
ﬁrst-best outcome: if the majority wants to take the collective action and is will-
ing to compensate the minority, the minority might be convinced to participate.
However, the use of transfers is subject to two limitations. First, transfers have
to be self-enforcing, just as the decision to participate in the collective action: in
other words, a member may refuse to pay. Second, players will have an incentive to
vote strategically: a member who favors war may be tempted to vote against the
collective action, hoping to get compensation.
A complete characterization of the optimal self-enforcing mechanism for all val-
ues of δ when transfers are available is a very diﬃcult task, but we will show the
following two results: (i) transfers help sustain the ﬁrst-best outcome, in the sense
of expanding the range of discount factors for which the ﬁrst-best majority rule
is sustainable, but (ii) for suﬃciently low values of the discount factor, unanimity
remains the best possible governance mode.
Consider the following timing for the stage game. After players observe their θi
values, they vote. If the number of votes in favor of the collective action exceeds the
quota q, the collective action is taken. Then each minority member gets a transfer.14
Of course, the cost of transfers must be ﬁnanced by the majority members. One
can show that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the transfer is equal for
all minority members, and the cost is split evenly among the majority members.15
Note that the transfer can depend on the number of votes in favor of action, V 1.
For this reason, we will speak of a “transfer scheme,” and denote t(V 1) the transfer
received by each minority member. Observe right away that budget balance implies
that each majority member must contribute an amount
(N−V 1)t(V 1)
V 1 .A l s on o t et h a t ,
since t(V 1) is balanced and utility is transferable, the members’ common expected
utility associated with a pair (q,t(·)) is simply U(q).
We ﬁrst show that there exists a transfer scheme such that q∗ can be sustained for
aw i d e rr a n g eo fδ than in the absence of transfers, unless preferences are perfectly
correlated. Let δ be the minimum level of δ such that the ﬁrst-best rule q∗ can
14In principle one could consider the alternative sequence in which transfers are made before the
collective action is taken. However in this case transfers cannot help, because a member of the
minority will face the same temptation to cheat as in the absence of transfers.
15This is because, starting from an uneven transfer scheme, we can always redistribute from the
one that receives (pays) the most (least) to the one that receives (pays) the least (most) and still
satisfy all incentive constraints.
19be sustained in equilibrium in the game without transfers. We will construct an
equilibrium which entails the ﬁrst-best rule q∗ for δ = δ − ε,w h e r eε>0 is a small
number. Consider a simple trigger punishment strategy whereby the organization
reverts to the worst one-shot equilibrium if anyone refuses to participate in the
collective action or to make a required transfer. The punishment is conditional only
on past actions and transfers, not on past votes. Then a pair (q,t(·)) is part of an



























Pr(N1 = k|θi = θL)−(B−θL)Pr(N1 = q|θi = θL) ≤ 0
(7)
The ﬁrst constraint requires that a member who is against action have incentive to
participate: the one-time gain from cheating is θH − B − t(V 1),a n dt h el o s sf r o m
cheating is the future value of cooperation, δ
1−δU(q). The second condition requires
that a member who is in favor of action have incentive to contribute to the cost of
transfers. The gain from cheating here is given by the contribution,
(N−V 1)t(V 1)
V 1 ,a n d
the loss from cheating is again the future value of cooperation. The third constraint
requires that a member who is in favor of action have incentive to vote sincerely. By
voting strategically, this member gains t(V 1 −1)+
(N−V 1)t(V 1)
V 1 (he gets the transfer
and avoids the contribution) in the event that he is not pivotal, that is when N1 >q ;
and loses (B − θL) in the event that he is pivotal, that is when N1 = q.
Notice that, if δ = δ, the pair (q,t(·)) = (q∗,0) satisﬁes (5) with equality and the
other two constraints with slack, provided Pr(N1 = q∗|θi = θL) > 0. This condition
is generically satisﬁed, except if preferences are perfectly correlated. Now consider
a small constant transfer t.F o rt small enough, (q∗,t) satisﬁes all three constraints
with slack if δ = δ. But this implies that (q∗,t) satisﬁes the three constraints also if
δ is slightly lower than δ.T h i sp r o v e so u rﬁrst claim.
Our second claim is that, for suﬃciently low values of δ, unanimity is the best
possible governance mode. To see this, note that a necessary condition for a pair








This means that given a small value of δ, the transfer must be strictly positive
for any V 1 ≥ q. Upon inspection of (6), however, it is easy to see that if δ =0 ,
maxV 1≥q t(V 1) ≤ 0. Therefore it is impossible to satisfy both (5) and (6) when δ
goes to zero. It follows that unanimity is the only sustainable outcome.
The following proposition summarizes the main insight of this section:
Proposition 7 The availability of transfers expands the range of δ for which the
ﬁrst-best rule q∗ is sustainable, but for low enough values of δ unanimity remains
the optimal self-enforcing rule.
Broadly interpreted, this result suggests that an organization is more likely to
be governed by majority rather than unanimity if it has the ﬂexibility to make pure
transfers between its members.
4 Endogenous organization size
In this section we examine how the mode of governance evolves over time when the
organization has opportunities to expand.
We think of the expansion of the organization as endogenous, in the following
sense. The initial membership, N0, is exogenously given. In each period t ≥ 1,a
random number zt ≥ 0 of new countries become candidates for membership. These
may be countries that for some reason become interested in joining the organization
at time t, or countries that become eligible for membership at time t as they meet
requirements such as a good human rights record, or a democratic system. We
assume that zt is iid across periods.
Current and potential members are all ex-ante identical. We assume that, if a
candidate is rejected at t, it is eligible again at t +1(thus if the organization keeps
rejecting applicants, the pool of applicants keeps getting larger). This is a natural
assumption given that candidates are all ex-ante symmetric, so that there is no point
in selecting among candidates. Letting Zt ≡ N0 +
Pt
τ=1 zτ, the admission decision
by the Nt−1 current members boils down to choosing a number Nt ≤ Zt.W ea l l o w
the organization to reduce its size, that is Nt can be lower than Nt−1; however this
21will never happen in equilibrium, therefore for simplicity we will always talk about
admission decisions.
In this setting it is convenient to deﬁne the cost vector θt = {θi
t}∞
i=1 as including
all potential members. We assume that θt is iid across periods. Also, in line with
the assumption that all current and potential members are ex-ante symmetric, we
assume that the distribution of θt is symmetric with respect to its components θi
t.
At the beginning of each period, zt is realized, then current members decide how
many of the candidates (if any) to admit. Then the state θt is realized, and the
organization votes on the “issue of the day.” Since admissions take place before θt is
realized, the current members’ preferences on admissions are homogeneous, so the
admission decision is made to maximize the current members’ common expected
utility.
We allow the beneﬁt from collective action to depend on N, and denote it
B(N).16 Consistently with the analysis in the previous sections, we assume (i)
θL <B (N) <θ H for all N; this ensures that the collective action problem is in-
teresting for all N;a n d( i i )N
2 < d
θH−B(N)
θH−θL Ne <Nfor all N;t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrst-best
voting rule (conditional on N) is a majority rule. We abstract from the possibility
of transfers in this section.
Let U(q,N) be the expected utility given voting rule q and organization size N,
and let ˆ U(N) ≡ maxq U(q,N). To rule out ties that would make the analysis more
complicated, we assume the following genericity condition: ˆ U(N) 6= U(N0,N0) for
all N and N0.
A si nt h ec a s eo fﬁxed organization size, we can assume without loss of generality
that any deviation from the equilibrium path is followed by a trigger punishment
(permanent reversion to the status-quo equilibrium). We focus on equilibrium paths
where the voting rule q and the organization size N depend only on the current value
of the state variable Zt. Given this restriction, we look for the optimal equilibrium
path, that is the pair of functions (q(Zt),N(Zt)) that maximizes the members’







16We could allow also the cost parameters θL and θH to depend on N, but this would make the





δτE[U(q(Zt+τ),N(Zt+τ))|Zt] for all Zt such that q(Zt) <N(Zt)
(10)
N(Zt) ≤ Zt for all Zt (11)
where the expectation E is taken with respect to future values of Zt. Condition (10)
is the incentive constraint at time t; it requires that a high-cost type be willing to
participate in the collective action, given the expected future path of q and N.A s
in the case of constant N, the unanimity rule (q = N) need not satisfy any incentive
constraint.
We have the following result:
Proposition 8 There exist critical levels δl and δh,w i t h0 <δ l ≤ δh < 1,s u c h
that:
(I) For δ<δ l, the optimal self-enforcing voting rule is unanimity for all t;
(II) For δl ≤ δ<δ h, the optimal self-enforcing voting rule is unanimity up to some
(random) date ˆ t and then switches to a majority rule;
(III) For δ ≥ δh, the optimal self-enforcing voting rule is a majority rule for all t.
Proof. See Appendix.
Parts (I) and (III) of this proposition are quite intuitive, given the result of
proposition 4. Part (II) is more subtle. The key aspect of this result is that it
can never be optimal to switch from majority to unanimity, hence if there is any
regime switch it must be from unanimity to majority. The broad intuition for
this result is the following. The arrival of new candidates over time enlarges the
organization’s opportunity set (since candidates can be rejected), therefore the value
of the organization cannot decrease over time, and hence the right hand side of
the incentive constraint cannot decrease over time. If B(N) is increasing, the left
hand side of the incentive constraint (θH − B(N))i sd e c r e a s i n gi nN, therefore the
incentive constraint can never get tighter over time, and the result follows right
away. If B(N) is decreasing, on the other hand, the key observation is that the
unanimity payoﬀ U(N,N) is decreasing in N.17 This implies that it cannot be
optimal to switch from majority to unanimity at the same time as new members
17Recall that U(N,N)=( B(N) − θL)Pr(θ
1 = θ
2 = ... = θ




N = θL) is nonincreasing in N.
23are admitted, because this is dominated by switching rule and keeping N constant.
But if N does not change, there is no reason to switch from majority to unanimity.
We emphasize that this result relies crucially on the presence of a self-enforcement
constraint. In a world of enforceable voting, the majority quota would not neces-
sarily go down as the organization expands: the optimal voting rule would always
be q∗, which may increase or decrease with N.
The proposition does not ensure that there exist values of δ for which a regime
s w i t c ho c c u r s ,b e c a u s ei tm a yb eδl = δh.W h e n i s δl <δ h? This inequality will
be satisﬁed if B(N) is suﬃciently increasing in the relevant range (more precisely,
when B(N) − B(N0) is suﬃciently large for some N>N 0). Intuitively, when this
is the case, new candidates will be admitted, and as the organization expands the
incentive constraint gets relaxed, because the gain from cheating decreases and the
value of the organization increases. Then there will be intermediate values of δ for
which the ﬁrst-best rule is initially not sustainable but it becomes sustainable later
on.
At the outset of the paper we highlighted that some international organizations,
such as the European Union and the International Standards Organization, have
moved over time from unanimity to some type of majority rule. It is hard to think,
on the other hand, of organizations that have experienced the reverse switch, that
is from majority to unanimity. Our model oﬀers a theoretical explanation for this
“stylized fact”.
The previous result focuses on the evolution of the voting rule. Does the model
have anything to say about the evolution of the organization size N? The path of
N in general can take many diﬀerent forms, but if we are willing to impose more
structure on the problem we get interesting predictions on the steady-state level of
N.
The steady-state level of N depends on the discount factor δ.I fδ is relatively
low, so that the organization is governed by unanimity, the steady-state size is
given by the level of N that maximizes expected utility conditional on unanimity, or
˜ N =a r gm a x N U(N,N).If δ is relatively high, so that the organization is governed
by the ﬁrst-best rule, the steady-state size is given by the ﬁrst-best level of N, or
ˆ N =a r g m a x N ˆ U(N). Intuitively, ˜ N should be lower than ˆ N, because unanimity
tends to work better in smaller organizations. We can conﬁrm this intuition if we
make two additional assumptions: ﬁrst, θi
t is independent across members and has
a symmetric distribution; and second, B is nondecreasing in N. We were not able
24to dispense with these assumptions, but we conjecture that this result holds under
fairly general conditions.
Proposition 9 Suppose that θi











, and that B(·) is nondecreasing. Then the steady-state level of N is
(weakly) increasing in δ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus the model predicts that organizations whose members discount the future
less heavily tend to be larger. Furthermore, Proposition 9 implies a prediction about
the co-variation of the organization size and the mode of governance. Consider a
world where organizations are heterogenous with respect to the discount factor: in
such a world, according to the model, organizations governed by unanimity tend
to be smaller than organizations governed by majority. Notice that the result of
Proposition 8, which is a “time-series” statement about a given organization, goes
in a similar direction: if δ is in the range (δl,δh), an organization is governed by
unanimity in the early stages of its expansion process (hence when it is smaller),
a n di ti sg o v e r n e db ym a j o r i t yi nt h el a t e rstages of its expansion process (hence
when it is larger). Again, this suggests that organizations governed by unanimity
should tend to be smaller.
5 Impure collective action
In this section we consider situations where the collective action may be eﬀective
even if not all members participate. We speak in this case of “impure collective
action”. We will revisit the results of the model, focusing ﬁrst on the case of ﬁxed
membership size N, and then on the case of endogenous N.
Formally, let B(n,N) denote the beneﬁt accruing to an individual member if n
members out of N take action. Assume B(n,N) is increasing in n,w i t hB(0,N)=0 .
Also assume that nB(n,N) is weakly convex in n. This is a relatively mild condition,
which is satisﬁed for example if B has constant elasticity in n (i.e., B(n,N)=
h(N)ng(N) for arbitrary nonnegative functions h,g). We do not need to impose any
restrictions on how B depends on N.




25All other assumptions of the model are unchanged. Note the implicit assump-
tion that the beneﬁts from the collective action are excludable: the members who
do not participate receive no beneﬁt from collective action. There are some situ-
ations in which this assumption is realistic: for example, when the EU decided to
adopt a common currency, the United Kingdom chose not to participate, and it
arguably did not share in the beneﬁts from the venture. But the primary reason for
this assumption is theoretical. Our model focuses on a simple type of cooperation
problem, where there is an ex-post incentive to defect for high-cost members. If the
beneﬁts of collective action are non-excludable, an additional cooperation problem is
introduced, that is a temptation to free ride even by low-cost types, that is members
who favor collective action ex-post. Furthermore, this could potentially introduce
incentives to vote strategically. While this might be an interesting direction for fu-
ture extensions, here we prefer to shut down this additional free-rider problem. We
also note that our results will remain unchanged if some of the beneﬁts spill over to
non-participants, as long as this spillover is not too large; or if the beneﬁts are fully
non-excludable but the cost of action is relatively small.18
We present our results through a series of remarks, which are all proved in
Appendix. Let us start by looking at the one-shot game without enforcement. Let
nmin denote the ﬁrst integer n such that B(n,N) ≥ θL,a n dV 1 the number of “yes”
votes.
Remark 2 The worst equilibrium of the one-shot game is the status-quo equilibrium
(ai =0in all states). The best equilibrium of the one-shot game is the following:
all members vote sincerely; then, if V 1 <n min, no one takes action; if V 1 ≥ nmin,
the members who have voted “yes” take action.
Note that, if nmin = N, this equilibrium coincides with the “unanimity” equilib-
rium that we found in the case of pure collective action. More generally, action is
taken by a “coalition of the willing.” The only diﬀerence between this equilibrium
and the simple unanimity equilibrium is that the minimum eﬃc i e n ts i z ef o rt h e
coalition of the willing (nmin)m a yb el o w e rt h a nN. For this reason we feel justiﬁed
in interpreting this as a modiﬁed unanimity equilibrium.
18To see this latter point, note that a collective action problem with fully non-excludable beneﬁts
c a nb ec a p t u r e db yt h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nU = B(n,N) − a
iθ
i.I fθL is small enough, a low-cost type
internalizes enough of the beneﬁts that she will not have incentive to free-ride on other low-cost
types.
26Next we suppose that external enforcement is available, and characterize the
ﬁrst-best voting rule.
Remark 3 If external enforcement is available, the ﬁrst-best outcome can be im-
plemented by a voting rule with the following structure: if V 1 <q 1, no one takes
action; if q1 ≤ V 1 <q 2, the members who have voted “yes” take action; if V 1 ≥ q2,
all members must take action (where 1 ≤ q1 ≤ q2 ≤ N).
This rule is similar to the ﬁrst-best rule in the case of pure collective action,
except that there may be an intermediate interval of V 1 for which action is taken
only by a coalition of the willing. Note that the intermediate interval of V 1 may be
empty (q1 = q2), in which case the optimal mechanism is the same as in the case of
pure collective action.
Next we consider self-enforcing voting rules. The question is to what extent
proposition 4 is robust to situations of impure collective action. We have the fol-
lowing result.
Remark 4 There exists a critical level ˆ δ such that: (i) for δ ≥ ˆ δ, the optimal
self-enforcing voting rule is the ﬁrst-best rule described in remark 3; (ii) for δ<ˆ δ,
the optimal self-enforcing voting rule is the “modiﬁed unanimity” rule described in
remark 2.
This is a generalization of the bang-bang result that we obtained in the case
of pure collective action. If δ is relatively high, the ﬁrst-best voting rule can be
sustained, but if δ is relatively low, the most that can be achieved is the best
equilibrium of the one-shot game. The only diﬀerence with respect to the case of
pure collective action is that, both in the ﬁrst-best voting rule and in the modiﬁed-
unanimity rule, action may be taken by a “coalition of the willing” for certain
realizations of the state of the world θ.
Finally, we reconsider the case of endogenous organization size under the new
assumption of impure collective action. A similar result as proposition 8 holds:
Remark 5 Consider the model with endogenous size as in section 4, except that
the assumption of “pure” collective action is replaced by that of “impure” collective
action. Then the optimal self-enforcing rule is the modiﬁed-unanimity rule for t<ˆ t
and the ﬁrst-best rule for t ≥ ˆ t (where ˆ t may be zero or inﬁnity, in which case the
rule never changes).
27Intuitively, the same force that drives the result in the case of pure collective
action is operating here: as the organization enjoys increasing opportunities to ex-
pand over time, the value of the organization can only grow, and hence sustaining
the ﬁrst-best voting rule can only get easier over time.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have argued that taking self-enforcement considerations into ac-
count can radically change the conclusions of our models on optimal voting systems.
Analyzing self-enforcing voting systems is not just an abstract theoretical exercise,
but it can help us understand important features of reality. In the world of interna-
tional organizations there is a wide variation in the mode of governance, both across
organizations and over time. Standard enforceable-voting models are not very ef-
fective in explaining this variation, and in particular the frequent occurrence of the
unanimity system. We have proposed a simpl em o d e lo fs e l f - e n f o r c i n gv o t i n gt h a t
delivers interesting predictions on the occurrence of unanimity vs. majority systems,
and can contribute to explain the observed variation in the mode of governance.
In this ﬁnal section we discuss the robustness of our results along two dimensions:
ﬁrst, we consider the issue of renegotiation-proof punishments; second, we discuss
the implications of ex-ante asymmetries among countries.
We have focused on equilibria where deviations are punished with a permanent
reversion to the status-quo equilibrium. This type of punishment suﬀers from a
problem of collective credibility: once the game is in the punishment phase, there
is a strong incentive for players to collectively reconsider the plan of action. We
do not have a complete analysis of renegotiation-proof equilibria. However, we
have in mind a simple alternative punishment strategy that is much more robust to
renegotiation than the trigger punishment we considered in the previous sections:
a player that deviates could be expelled from the organization. This punishment
would give the deviator her maximin payoﬀ, which is the same as under a trigger
punishment, and hence the incentive constraints would be exactly the same as under
a trigger punishment. At the same time, the remaining N − 1 players would suﬀer
only a modest reduction of utility relative to the equilibrium path, so the incentives
to renegotiate in the punishment phase would be limited. Also note that, if N
is endogenous and the organization is at steady state, then punishing a deviator
with expulsion has a second-order impact on the utility of the remaining members,
28because N is at the level that maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the representative
member.
The reason we did not work directly with expulsion punishments is that this
would require expanding the strategy space in a way that makes the expulsion of
a member a meaningful strategy. One way of doing this would be to assume that,
for the organization to be eﬀective, each member must be connected with all other
m e m b e r s( e . g . ,i tm u s th a v ea na c t i v ec o m munication line). At the beginning of
each period, each member has the option of cutting the communication line with
one or more other members. If a member is disconnected from all others, it cannot
participate in the collective action, and is eﬀectively “expelled”. In this extended
game, after a player has deviated, it is an equilibrium for the players who have not
deviated to cut the connection with the deviator and continue cooperating among
themselves. Rather than expanding the game in this fashion and make the notation
more complicated, we opted to keep the more basic version of the game and work
with the simpler trigger punishment.
In this paper we have assumed that the organization members design the institu-
tion under a veil of ignorance. We believe that in some environments this assumption
is not unreasonable. Even if members are asymmetric at the stage in which they
negotiate the rules of the organization, this asymmetry will play a negligible role
if it is diﬃcult to predict the exact nature of the issues that the organization will
face in the future, so that it is diﬃcult to predict what the relevant payoﬀ functions
will be. In this type of environment, the veil-of-ignorance assumption is a reason-
able approximation. In other environments, it may be more reasonable to assume
that members have asymmetric payoﬀ functions at the institution-design stage and
present asymmetries are powerful predictors of future asymmetries for the issues to
come, in which case one needs to depart from the veil-of-ignorance setting.
One simple way of capturing ex-ante asymmetries of this kind would be to sup-
pose that countries have (persistently) diﬀerent status quo utilities. This would also
be a way of capturing asymmetries of “power” within an organization: countries
with a higher status quo utility are more powerful in the sense that they have less
to lose from a break-up of the organization. Extending the analysis to this type of
setting is a complex task that is outside the scope of this paper, but our initial intu-
ition is that some interesting new results would arise, without upsetting the general
insights developed in this paper. A key implication of the presence of power asym-
metries would be that the self-enforcement constraint is more stringent for countries
29with higher status quo utility, because they cannot be punished as severely as the
weaker countries. This suggests that, for intermediate values of the discount factor,
the optimal self-enforcing voting system would give veto power to the more powerful
members. The main diﬀerence with respect to the case of ex-ante symmetric coun-
tries therefore would be that under some conditions the best way to cope with the
self-enforcement problem is to grant veto power to a subset of members, whereas
under ex-ante symmetry veto power is either granted to all members (unanimity)
or to none of them.
307A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :
We start by proving the following
Lemma 1 Let (qo(Zt),No(Zt)) denote the optimal plan: (i) The value function
V (Zt)=
P∞
τ=0 δτE[U(qo(Zt+τ),No(Zt+τ))|Zt] is nondecreasing in Zt; (ii) The in-
stantaneous payoﬀ U(qo(Zt),No(Zt)) is nondecreasing in Zt. (iii) The continuation
value
P∞
τ=1 δτE[U(qo(Zt+τ),No(Zt+τ))|Zt] is nondecreasing in Zt.
Proof :












U(qo(Zt + ∆t,τ),No(Zt + ∆t,τ))dF(∆t,τ|Zt)
where ∆t,τ = Zt+τ −Zt and F(∆t,τ|Zt) is the c.d.f. of ∆t,τ conditional on Zt.N o t e
that, given the iid assumption, F(∆t,τ|Zt) is independent of Zt.
Now suppose Zt is increased to Z0
t = Zt + ∆,w i t h∆ ap o s i t i v en u m b e r .G i v e n
this change, the new (random) value of Zt+τ is Z0
t+τ = Z0
t + ∆t,τ = Zt + ∆ + ∆t,τ.
We need to show that V (Zt + ∆) ≥ V (Zt). We do this by displaying a feasible
contingency plan that, when starting from state Z0
t = Zt + ∆, attains value V (Zt).





(qo(Zt+∆t,τ),No(Zt+∆t,τ)). In words, we are “ignoring” the increment ∆,s ot h i s
plan yields the same path for q and N starting from Zt +∆ as did the original plan
starting from Zt, for any realization of {∆t,τ}∞
τ=1. Clearly, this plan still satisﬁes





U(qo(Zt + ∆t,τ),No(Zt + ∆t,τ))dF(∆t,τ|Zt + ∆)
Since F(∆t,τ|Zt + ∆)=F(∆t,τ|Zt), this value is equal to V (Zt). It remains to
argue that the proposed plan is incentive compatible at all dates. This follows
from the facts that (i) the original plan (qo(·),No(·)) is incentive compatible at all
d a t e s ,a n d( i i )b yt h eiid assumption, ∆ does not aﬀect the distribution of the
future increments ∆t,τ, τ =1 ,...,∞, therefore for all s ≥ t the continuation value
31P∞
τ=1 δτEs[U(qo(Zs+τ),No(Zs+τ))] is independent of ∆. We can conclude that ∆
does not aﬀect either the LHS or the RHS of the incentive constraint at any s ≥ t.
(ii) Suppose by contradiction that there exist Zt−1 and Zt such that U(qo(Zt−1),No(Zt−1)) >
U(qo(Zt),No(Zt)). Now consider an alternative plan (q0(·),N0(·)) that is identical
to (qo(·),No(·)) except that (q0(Zt),N0(Zt)) = (qo(Zt−1),No(Zt−1)). This strictly
increases the instantaneous payoﬀ at Zt, and hence the overall value V (Z0).T h e
new plan clearly satisﬁes (11). Since the current payoﬀ at t is being increased, all
incentive constraints for previous dates are still satisﬁed. We only need to argue
that the incentive constraint at t is still satisﬁed. If qo(Zt−1)=No(Zt−1) (unanim-
ity) this is obvious. Focus then on the case qo(Zt−1) <N o(Zt−1) and suppose the
incentive constraint at t is not satisﬁed. Then, since the original plan is incentive
compatible at t − 1, it must be that the continuation value for the new plan at t is






















which is impossible given part (i) of this lemma. We can conclude that plan
(q0(·),N0(·)) is incentive compatible, and hence it dominates plan (qo(·),No(·)).B u t
this contradicts the optimality of (qo(·),No(·)).
(iii) Given the iid assumption, increasing Zt shifts the conditional distribution of
Zt+τ in a ﬁrst-order stochastic sense for all τ,t h a ti s ,FZt+τ|Zt=Z0 FSD FZt+τ|Zt=Z
i fa n do n l yi fZ0 ≥ Z. This, together with the fact that U(qo(Zt),No(Zt)) is nonde-
creasing in Zt (part (ii) of this lemma), implies the claim. QED.
We turn now to the proof of the proposition. The ﬁr s tr e m a r ki st h a tw ec a n
focus without loss of generality on two voting rules: unanimity, that is q = N,a n d
the ﬁrst-best rule conditional on N,t h a ti sq∗(N)=d
θH−B(N)
θH−θL Ne.T h i si sb e c a u s e
(a) if any q<Nis sustainable at a given date, so is q∗(N) at that date; and (b) if
q∗(N) is incentive compatible at a given date then it is also optimal at that date.
32The proof will proceed in ﬁve steps. We will show that: (i) for δ suﬃciently low,
q(Zt)=N(Zt) for all Zt at an optimum; (ii) for δ suﬃciently high, q(Zt)=q∗(N(Zt))
for all Zt at an optimum; (iii) if for δ = δ0 the optimum entails q(Zt)=N(Zt) for
all Zt, then the same is true for all δ<δ 0;( i v )i ff o rδ = δ00 the optimum entails
q(Zt)=q∗(N(Zt)) for all Zt, then the same is true for all δ>δ 00;( v )i ti sn e v e r
optimal to switch from a majority rule to unanimity at any point in time. The claim
will then follow.
(i) If δ is suﬃciently close to zero, any rule other than unanimity violates (10),
therefore permanent unanimity is the only feasible solution. This is ensured because
B(N) is bounded, hence U is bounded.
(ii) Consider the solution of the problem without constraint (10). Clearly, this
plan entails q(Zt)=q∗(N(Zt)) for all Zt.I fδ is suﬃciently close to one, (10) is not
binding at this plan, hence this is also the solution of the constrained problem. We
can conclude that the optimal voting rule is q(Zt)=q∗(N(Zt)) for all Zt.
(iii) Let us denote a contingency plan by S(Zt)=( q(Zt),N(Zt)) and the associ-
ated utility by e U(S(Zt)) = U(q(Zt),N(Zt)).L e tu sc a l lSU(Zt)=( NU(Zt),NU(Zt))
the optimal plan for δ = δ0. Suppose by contradiction that there is some δ00 <δ 0
such that the optimal plan — call it Sm(Zt) — entails majority for some Z0
t . Because
SU(Zt) is feasible for all δ,w em u s th a v ee U(Sm(Zt)) ≥ e U(SU(Zt)) for all Zt,w i t h
strict inequality for Zt = Z0
t from our genericity condition. But if Sm(.) is feasible
for δ = δ00, it remains feasible for δ = δ0 >δ 00, a contradiction with SU(.) being
optimal for δ = δ0.
(iv) Suppose by contradiction that for δ = δ00 the optimal plan SM(Zt) entails
a majority rule for all Zt,a n df o rs o m eδ0 >δ 00 the optimal plan Su(Zt) entails
unanimity for some Z0
t .T h i s i m p l i e se U(SM(Z0
t )) > e U(Su(Z0
t )), for otherwise we
could improve on SM(Zt) by replacing SM(Z0
t ) with Su(Z0
t ); this would be feasible
and would improve the value of the objective. We will now show that Su(Zt) cannot
be optimal for δ = δ0. Consider an alternative plan S
0
(.) such that S
0
(Zt)=Su(Zt)






















t ) is feasible. Since for Zt <Z 0
t the incentive
constraint has been relaxed, S
0














,w ec a ni m p r o v eo n
Su(Zt) with a plan S
00
(·) such that S
00




Su(Zt) for Zt <Z 0
t .S i n c eSM(·) is feasible for δ = δ00,i ti sa l s of e a s i b l ef o rδ0 >δ 00,
and hence S
00
(Zt) is feasible for Zt ≥ Z0
t . Moreover, since the value function at Z0
t
33has been increased, S
00
(Zt) is feasible also for Zt <Z 0
t . It follows that the value of
the whole program has been increased, a contradiction.
(v) Suppose by contradiction that at the optimal plan (qo(·),No(·)) there exist
Zt and Zt−1 such that qo(Zt−1) <N o(Zt−1) and qo(Zt)=No(Zt). We need to
distinguish three cases:
(va) B(No(Zt)) ≥ B(No(Zt−1)). In this case we can do better with a plan
(q0(·),N0(·)) that is identical to the original one except that q0(Zt)=q∗(No(Zt)).
This increases the instantaneous payoﬀ at Zt and satisﬁes (11). We need to show that
it is incentive compatible. The fact that the instantaneous payoﬀ at t is higher under
the new plan ensures that the incentive constraint is satisﬁed for all dates before t.
The new path also satisﬁes the incentive constraint at t.T os e et h i s ,c o m p a r ei tw i t h
the incentive constraint at t − 1 for the old plan: since B(No(Zt)) ≥ B(No(Zt−1)),
the left hand side is weakly lower; and by point (iii) of lemma 1, the right hand side
is weakly higher. We can conclude that the new plan dominates the original plan,
which contradicts the optimality of the latter.
(vb) B(No(Zt)) <B (No(Zt−1)) and No(Zt) >N o(Zt−1).I n t h i s c a s e w e
can do better with a plan (q0(·),N0(·)) that is identical to the original one except
that N0(Zt)=No(Zt−1); that is, no new members are admitted at Zt.T os e et h i s ,
recall that U(N,N)=P r N(θ1 = ... = θN = θL)(B(N) − θL).T h e ﬁrst factor
is always decreasing in N, therefore the proposed change increases instantaneous
payoﬀ at Zt. The proposed plan clearly also satisﬁes all constraints, therefore the
optimality of the original plan is contradicted.
(vc) B(No(Zt)) <B (No(Zt−1)) and No(Zt) <N o(Zt−1). Then it must be
that (qo(Zt−1),No(Zt−1)) implies a higher instantaneous payoﬀ than (qo(Zt),No(Zt)),
for otherwise (qo(Zt),No(Zt)) would have been chosen already at Zt−1 (clearly all
constraints would still have been satisﬁed). But this contradicts part (ii) of lemma
1. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 : 19
All we need to prove is ˆ N>˜ N. For this purpose it suﬃces to show the following:
ˆ U(N +1 )
ˆ U(N)
≥
U(N +1 ,N+1 )
U(N,N)
for all N (13)
It is not hard to see that the above condition implies the claim.
19We owe this proof to Arnaud Costinot.
34Using the deﬁnitions of ˆ U(N) and U(N,N) and assuming w.l.o.g. θL =0 ,( 1 3 )























B(N) and αN ≡
B(N)
θH . Note that λN ≥ 1 because B(N) is nondecreasing,
and αN ∈ [ 1
















[k − (1 − αN)N]
(15)
Since it can be easily shown that q∗(N +1 )≤ q∗(N)+1 ,as u ﬃcient condition
for (15) to hold is that the same condition hold when q∗(N +1 )is replaced with











































(q∗(N) − (1 − αN)(N +1 ) )
(16)
where the last step follows from a simple application of Pascal’s triangle. Let us
ﬁrst show that this inequality holds for λN =1and for all αN ∈ [ 1























(q∗(N) − (1 − αN)(N +1 ) )
(17)
To show this, we will check that the LHS is a (weakly) steeper function of αN
compared with the RHS. Consider ﬁrst the case in which αNN is not an integer, so
that q∗ = d(1 − αN)Ne remains constant when αN is marginally increased. Then
∂LHS17
∂αN ≥ ∂RHS17

























20The lower bound comes from the fact that q
∗(N) can be rewritten as d(1 − αN)Ne and q
∗(N) <
N.














which is obviously true. Next consider the case in which αNN is an integer. Letting


































































which also clearly holds since the LHS is non-negative and the RHS is non-positive.
At this point, we have proved that (16) holds for λN =1and all αN.T o s e e
that (16), and thus (14), still holds for λN > 1, one just needs to verify that the
derivative of the LHS of (16) with respect to λN is higher than the derivative of the































[k − (1 − αN)N]
QED.
P r o o fo fR e m a r k2 :straightforward.
P r o o fo fR e m a r k3 : Recall that N1 is the number of low-cost members,
and let n1 be the number of low-cost members who participate in the action. Let
N0 = N − N1 and n0 the number of high cost members who participate in the
action. Since N is ﬁx e d ,i nt h i sp r o o fa n dt h en e x tw ew i l ld r o pi ta sa r g u m e n to f
the B function, and will simply write B(n).
36In order to ﬁnd the ﬁrst-best mapping we need to maximize the joint surplus of
the group with respect to n0 and n1:
max
n0,n1 J(n0,n 1) ≡ n1[B(n0 + n1) − θL]+n0[B(n0 + n1) − θH] (18)
s.t. 0 ≤ n0 ≤ N − N1,0 ≤ n1 ≤ N1 (19)
Since nB(n) is assumed to be weakly convex, it is easy to see that J is convex
in each argument. The convexity of J implies that the solution is corner.
There are only 4 candidate corners: (n0,n 1) ∈ {(0,0),(N −N1,0),(0,N1),(N −
N1,N1)}.C l e a r l y ,(N − N1,0) is dominated: it cannot be optimal that high cost
types act and low cost types do not. Thus we have to compare the values J(0,0) = 0,
J(0,N1)=N1[B(N1)−θL],a n dJ(N−N1,N1)=N1[B(N)−θL]+(N−N1)[B(N)−
θH]=NB(N) − NθH + N1(θH − θL).
The comparison depends on the value of N1. Consider the functions of N1
g0(N1)=J(0,N1) and g1(N1)=J(N − N1,N1).N o t et h a t( I )g1(0) < 0=g0(0);
(II) g0(N)=g1(N);( I I I )g0(N1) is convex and g1(N1) is linear; (IV) g0(N1) ≤ 0
for N1 <n min and g0(N1) > 0 for N1 >n min;( V )g1(N1) < 0 for N1 <q ∗ and
g1(N1) > 0 for N1 ≥ q∗. (Note that q∗ c a nb eh i g h e ro rl o w e rt h a nnmin.) Using
this information we can conclude that there are three possibilities:
1. There is a quota q2 >n min such that the optimum is (N−N1,N1) for N1 >q 2,
(0,N1) for nmin <N 1 <q 2,a n d(0,0) if N1 <n min.
2. The optimum is (0,N1) for N1 >n min and (0,0) otherwise.
3. The optimum is (N − N1,N1) for N1 >q ∗ and (0,0) otherwise.
The convexity of g0, the linearity of g1, and the other boundary conditions on
these functions guarantee that there are no other possibilities. It is easy to see that
each of these cases is consistent with the statement of remark 3: in the ﬁrst case,
all three intervals of the ﬁrst-best schedule are non-empty; in the second case, the
upper interval is empty; and in the third case, the intermediate interval is empty.
Finally, it is easy to verify that the ﬁrst-best outcome we just described can be
implemented with the voting rule proposed in remark 3.





37Let Ui(σ) denote the one-period expected utility of member i given σ.G i v e n
that we are restricting to strategies that give all players the same expected payoﬀ,
we have Ui(σ)=U(σ) for all i. The key is to argue that we can focus on two
proﬁles: (i) the proﬁle that corresponds to the modiﬁed-unanimity rule deﬁned in
r e m a r k2—l e tσu denote such proﬁle; and (ii) the proﬁle that corresponds to the
ﬁrst-best voting rule deﬁn e di nr e m a r k3—l e tσ∗ denote such proﬁle.
Clearly, if σ∗ is self-enforcing, then it is optimal, since it maximizes U(σ).T h e
self-enforcement condition for σ∗ is




The LHS is the one-period gain from cheating, which occurs when a θH type is
called to action.
An alternative proﬁle σ can be preferred to σ∗ only if it implies a one-period
gain from cheating strictly lower than θH − B(N) for all states θ.S i n c e B(n) is
increasing, a proﬁle σ can satisfy this condition only if a θH type is never called to
action, for otherwise his gain from cheating would be at least θH − B(N).B u t i f
θH types are never called to action, it is easy to see that we can do no better than
σu. It is also clear that σu implies no unilateral incentive to deviate, since it is an
equilibrium of the stage game. Therefore the only candidates for an optimum are
σu and σ∗. We can easily conclude that σ∗ is optimal if δ is higher than a critical
level, and σu is optimal otherwise. QED.
P r o o fo fR e m a r k5 : The proof of Proposition 8 up to point (iv) applies
identically to the case of impure collective action, provided “unanimity” rule is
replaced with “modiﬁed unanimity” rule, and the majority rule is replaced with the
ﬁrst-best rule described in remark 3. As for point (v) of the proof, notice that the
relevant gain from cheating with the ﬁrst-best rule is now θH − B(N,N).T h i s i s
because a high-cost type is called to action only if everyone else is called to action.
Letting ˜ B(N) ≡ B(N,N), part (v) of that proof can be applied simply replacing
B(N) with ˜ B(N). QED.
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